Stefan Kirkegaard Sløk-Madsen, David Skarbek, Andreas Hansen & Alexander Rezaei: The organization of Danish gangs: a transaction cost approach.

How do criminal groups organize, operate, and govern in Denmark? We argue that organized crime groups face governance challenges in the form of principal-agent problems and transaction costs. Based on interviews with law enforcement officers, former gang members, and prisoners, we provide evidence for how people involved in crime respond Read more…

Stefano Dughera & Alain Marciano: Supervise me if you can. Relational feelings, incentive pays and supervisory violations.

We study a bonus pay setting where a principal hires a supervisor to evaluate a group of potentially shirking workers. The supervisor and her workers develop relational feelings (either positive or negative) after interacting with each other. We analyze a novel class of organizational infractions where the supervisor provides false Read more…

Malte Dold & Matias Petersen: Stability of the liberal order, moral learning, and constitutional choice: an unresolved tension in James Buchanan’s political economy.

Buchanan mentions at several points in his oeuvre the necessary role for a constitutional attitude. This attitude is both explanatory and evaluative; it explains why citizens value liberty but also highlights one of the necessary conditions for the stability of a free society. In their new paper, NOUS member Malte Dold Read more…

Alexander Haupt & Tim Krieger: The role of relocation mobility in tax and subsidy competition

In this paper, NOUS members Tim Krieger and Alexander Haupt analyse the role of relocation mobility in tax and subsidy competition. Their primary result is that increasing mobility of firms leads to increasing ‘net’ tax revenues under plausible assumptions. While enhanced relocation mobility intensifies tax competition, it weakens subsidy competition. Read more…

Andreas Polk and Michael Hellwig: Do political links influence water prices?

In their new paper, NOUS member Andreas Polk and Michael Hellwig explain water prices in Germany by analyzing demand and cost drivers, governance structures and political links to local politicians. First, they find evidence for economies of scope between supply and wastewater treatment. Soil rigidity significantly influences water prices, and prices tend Read more…