This paper constitutes the start of Stefan Kolev’s project dedicated to Austrian economist and economic sociologist Friedrich von Wieser (1851-1926). Its central claim is that especially in recent decades, Wieser has become a disproportionately underresearched scholar, and the paper provides a set of arguments why this is unjustified.
In this paper, Christian Schubert elaborates on the political economy driving the implementation of “nudges” by self-interested (and possibly boundedly rational) policy makers and bureaucrats.
This paper explores the four decades of intellectual relationship between the Austrian School economist Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973) and two major representatives of German ordoliberalism, Walter Eucken (1891-1950) and Wilhelm Röpke (1899-1966). The timespan covered starts in the early 1920s and terminates with Röpke’s passing in 1966. The central goal of the paper is to provide a more nuanced understanding of the reasons for the hostile climate and the confrontation patterns than earlier narratives in secondary literature.
Nationalisme, libéralisme et post-modernité.
This is the first-ever English translation of an 1891 essay by Carl Menger published in the most important newspaper of the Habsburg Empire, the Neue Freie Presse. Menger writes the piece as a defense of classical political economy in general and of Adam Smith in particular, focusing on misinterpretations of Smith’s work by the Younger Historical School in Germany.
We develop a model of insurrection markets and integrate the youth bulge as measured by the relative youth cohort size. As youth-specific characteristics we define the young person’s attitude toward revolutionary groups and the government, the degree of risk aversion and the relative productivity of young people on the insurrection market as compared to the official labor market.
The theoretical literature on fiscal federalism has identified several channels through which government decentralization could affect economic growth. Much of the literature focuses on the efficiency aspects of a decentralized provision of public services, but decentralization may also increase growth by raising the ability of the political system to innovate and carry out reforms. In contrast, some authors argue that decentralization increases corruption and government inefficiency, and thus may diminish growth. Given this theoretical ambiguity, several studies have attempted to identify the effect of decentralization on economic growth empirically over the last two decades. We review and conduct a meta-analysis of this empirical literature. Based on our analysis, we point out open questions and discuss possible ways to answer them.
Formal fiscal rules have been introduced in many countries throughout the world. While most studies focus on the intra-jurisdictional effects of fiscal rules, vertical effects on the finances of other levels of government have yet to be explored thoroughly. This paper investigates the influence of Swiss cantonal debt brakes on municipal finances during the years 1980‐2011 by examining aggregated and disaggregated local data. A Difference‐in‐Differences estimation (two‐way fixed effects) provides little evidence that budget constraints at the cantonal level affect average municipal finances and fiscal decentralization.