Nationalisme, libéralisme et post-modernité.
This is the first-ever English translation of an 1891 essay by Carl Menger published in the most important newspaper of the Habsburg Empire, the Neue Freie Presse. Menger writes the piece as a defense of classical political economy in general and of Adam Smith in particular, focusing on misinterpretations of Smith’s work by the Younger Historical School in Germany.
In der ersten Augustwoche fanden sich 16 Oberstufenschüler und angehende Studenten im Umland von Berlin zusammen zur „AGORA – Sommerakademie für Philosophie, Ökonomie und Politik“. Eine Woche lang beschäftigten sich die hochmotivierten jungen Menschen mit grundlegenden wie auch mit ganz konkreten Fragestellungen aus den Bereichen, die unser Zusammenleben wesentlich prägen. Die Veranstaltung, die dieses Jahr zum ersten Mal in diesem Format durchgeführt wurde, war ein voller Erfolg, was insbesondere den großartigen Teilnehmern zu verdanken ist.
Nine out of ten countries currently have emergency provisions written into their constitutions here simply referred to as emergency constitutions. The nature of these provisions remains poorly understood. We therefore aim at providing first answers to two questions: 1) how much additional discretionary power do emergency constitutions allow and which political actors are given the additional power; and 2) is there a limited number of “typical” emergency constitutions that combine various aspects in similar or even identical fashion?
If voters do not perceive meaningful differences between parties and candidates, they tend to stay at home or choose by other factors like style or likability. This study examines whether including different kinds of information about the candidates on the ballot affects the satisfaction and turnout of voters in low-profile elections in which most candidates are unknown and party-identification cannot be used to distinguish them. This case often appears in election systems with either intra-party primaries or open lists, in particular at lower institutional levels.
in: Kurz, H. D., Faccarello, G. (eds.), Handbook of the History of Economic Analysis – Schools of Thought in Economics, Vol. 2, Edward Elgar, 2016, pp. 375-390.
in: Volker Stein, Mark-Oliver Carl und Julia Küchel (Hrsg.): Dekonstruktion und Rekontextualisierung von Mentoring, 2016, Leverkusen: Buderich, im Druck.
With the beginning of the Napoleonic war at the turn of the 19th century, capitalist transformation in the German states and in the Habsburg Empire took different routes. The article analyses the political economy of both types of ‘defensive modernization’ from the viewpoint of institutional economics. We argue that initial reforms in German states gave way to a transformation process which drove a wedge between the interest of the monarchs and the landed nobility. Liberal reformers established a political bargain with the nobility which made capitalist institutions acceptable for the power holders. Later on, reformers established a ‘market preserving federalism’ which gave capitalism a further boost. By contrast, the dependence of the Austrian Emperor on the multiethnic nobility weakened the power of the central state. The transformation process in the Habsburg Empire remained dependent on the personal interests of the dominant coalition, which either delayed capitalism or sought to combine capitalism with protectionism on its own behalf. As a result, capitalist dynamics took up speed in Germany but were delayed in Austria.